DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 
Application for the Correction of 
the Coast Guard Record of: 
 
                                                                                BCMR Docket No. 2001-111 
 
 
   

 

 
 

FINAL DECISION 

 
ANDREWS, Deputy Chair: 
 
 
This  proceeding  was  conducted  according  to  the  provisions  of  section  1552  of 
title  10,  United  States  Code.    It  was  commenced  on  July  23,  2001,  upon  the  BCMR’s 
receipt of the applicant’s completed application and military and medical records. 
 
 
members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case. 
 

This  final  decision,  dated  June  20,  2002,  is  signed  by  the  three  duly  appointed 

APPLICANT’S REQUEST AND ALLEGATIONS 

 
The  applicant  asked  the  Board  to  correct  his  discharge  form,  DD  214,  to  show 
 
that  he  was  separated  because  of  a  physical  disability—depression—and  assigned  an 
appropriate  separation  code  and  an  RE-1  reenlistment  code,  which  would  make  him 
eligible to reenlist.  Currently, his DD 214 shows that he was separated on July 14, 199x, 
after serving 14 years, 9 months, and 27 days on active duty, because of a personality 
disorder that rendered him unsuitable for military service.  His reenlistment code is RE-
3G, which means that he can reenlist if he can prove to military recruiters that the con-
dition for which he was discharged no longer exists.   
 
 
The applicant alleged that the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) has award-
ed him a 50-percent disability rating for dysthymic disorder.1  He alleged that this diag-
nosis and rating proves that the Coast Guard erred in discharging him for “unsuitabil-
ity.”  He alleged that he did not discover the error in his record until 1998. 
  
                                                 
1  Dysthymic  disorder,  or  dysthymia,  is  depression.    It  is  considered  a  physical  disability  by  the  Coast 
Guard and the DVA.  It is not considered a personality disorder.  Medical Manual, Chap. 5-B, para. 10, 11.   

 

SUMMARY OF THE APPLICANT’S RECORD 

On  September  18,  1979,  the  applicant  enlisted  in  the  Coast  Guard.    He  served 
continuously on active duty thereafter.  His military record contains no documentation 
of any misconduct during his service, and his performance evaluations were average.  

 
In July 199x, the applicant was assigned to a cutter.  On November 30, 199x, on 
his first performance evaluation on the cutter, he received several marks of 3 (on a scale 
of 1 to 7, with 7 being best) and a mark of “progressing” from his commanding officer 
in lieu of a recommendation for promotion.  On December 27, 199x, the applicant com-
plained  of  anxiety  and  depression  and  was  prescribed  Alprazolam2  by  a  physician’s 
assistant.  He was also referred for psychiatric evaluation. 

 
On  January  12,  199x,  the  applicant  was  examined  by  Dr.  X,  a  psychiatrist  at  a 
Naval hospital.  He told the psychiatrist that he was severely stressed by certain family 
problems and by his dissatisfaction with his work.  He stated that he was having per-
sonality conflicts at his command and did not want to be underway.  He reported feel-
ing depressed and having poor memory, concentration, and variable appetite.  He had 
gained 22 pounds in five months.  Dr. X found that he had no thought disorder and that 
his mood was natural and his affect was congruent.  He diagnosed the applicant as suf-
fering  from  “dependent  personality  traits”  but  found  him  psychiatrically  fit  for  full 
duty, including sea duty.  He did not prescribe any medication.  He recommended that 
the applicant continue counseling. 

 
 
On February 2, 199x, while his cutter was deployed away from its homeport, the 
applicant was referred to another psychiatrist, Dr. Y, because of “anxiety and [a] history 
of suicidal ideation.”  The applicant reported that he had suffered from anxiety, irrita-
bility, insomnia, and inability to concentrate since he was assigned to a cutter in July 
199x.    When  the  cutter  was  deployed,  he  also  experienced  a  depressed  mood,  erratic 
appetite,  more  severe sleep  disturbance,  mood  swings,  and  “significant  suicidal  idea-
tion,”  including  plans  to  jump  overboard  during  rough  weather.    The  applicant 
reported having similar symptoms in 1985 or 1986, when he was stationed in xxxx while 
there was concern about conflict with Libya.   
 

Dr.  Y  found  that  the  applicant’s  “affect  was  dysthymic  with  full  range  and 
appropriate to stated thoughts.”  He diagnosed a panic disorder with “limited symptom 
attacks,” “obsessive compulsive traits,” and “dependent traits.”  The doctor indicated 
that the applicant was having “significant problems with concentration and memory.”  
He found him unfit for duty and unable to return to his ship.  He recommended that the 

                                                 
2  Alprazolam  is  prescribed  for  anxiety,  with  or  without  depression,  and  for  panic  disorders.    Monthly 
Prescribing Reference (January 2000). 

applicant be returned to his homeport and examined by Dr. X “for consideration of pos-
sible [medical] board.”  He prescribed Clonazepam.3 
 
On February 15, 199x, the applicant was again examined by Dr. X, who reported 
 
that his own diagnosis was “quite disparate” from that of Dr. Y.  Dr. X found that the 
applicant  suffered  from  “dependent  personality  traits”  and  “occupational  problems.”  
He found no “major mental illness” that would justify initiating a medical board.  Dr. X 
reported that “I believe [the applicant] dislikes the command, dislikes having to deploy 
and I believe he is trying to get separated from the [service].”  Dr. X ordered psycho-
logical testing to help resolve the different diagnoses. 
 
 
On March 15, 199x, Dr. X reported that psychological testing had revealed that 
the  applicant’s  “emotional  responses  are  consistent  with  a  personality  disorder  with 
dependent traits predominating.”  Dr. X stated that the applicant had “difficulty dealing 
with stress [and] conflict” and that he “becomes anxious, angry, [and] depressed when 
taken from those things which provide him [with] stability [and] security, such as his 
home, family,  [and] girlfriend.”  Dr. X diagnosed him with a “dependent personality 
disorder” but “no major mental illness.”  He strongly recommended that the applicant 
be  expeditiously  administratively  discharged  for  unsuitability.    He  did  not  prescribe 
any medication. 
 
 
On  April  29,  199x,  the  applicant’s  commanding  officer  (CO)  officially  notified 
him that he was initiating an administrative, honorable discharge “by reason of unsuit-
ability” because of his “documented personality disorder.”  The CO informed him that 
he had a right to a hearing before an Administrative Discharge Board (ADB), to consult 
with an attorney, and to submit a written statement on his own behalf.  The CO also 
told him that “[p]rior to any administrative action you will be given a physical exami-
nation by a medical officer to determine any disqualifying physical defects which are 
ratable as a disability.” 
 
 
On April 30, 199x, the applicant acknowledged receiving the CO’s notification of 
his pending administrative discharge and rights.  He indicated that he would submit a 
written statement. 
 
 
On May 5, 199x, the applicant was assigned counsel to represent him before an 
ADB.  However, on May 19, 199x, he signed a statement indicating that, after consulting 
with an attorney, he had decided to waive his right to appear before an ADB.  Also on 
May 19, 199x, the applicant informed his CO that he believed it would be in the “best 
interests of the Coast Guard and myself that I be separated from the service.”  He stated 

                                                 
3 Clonazepam is prescribed for panic disorders.  Monthly Prescribing Reference (January 2000). 
 

that  he  had  been  “dealing  with  many  problems”  that  disrupted  his  performance  and 
that his “command [had] done everything possible for me to deal with the problems.” 
 
On  May  27,  199x,  the  applicant’s  CO  recommended  to  the  Military  Personnel 
 
Command that he be administratively discharged because of his diagnosed personality 
disorder.  He reported that the applicant’s performance had been “marginal” and that, 
in January 199x, he had confessed to the cutter’s executive officer that he was “having 
trouble mentally coping with stress induced by sea duty and that he had contemplated 
suicide.”  
 
 
On June 8, 199x, the applicant, his counsel, and a witness signed an “Uncondi-
tional  Waiver  of  Hearing  Before  Administrative  Discharge  Board.”    The  waiver  indi-
cates that he knew he was being recommended for an honorable discharge because of 
unsuitability. 
 
 
On June 14, 199x, the Military Personnel Command ordered that the applicant be 
honorably discharged within 30 days by reason of unsuitability with a JFX separation 
code, which denotes the existence of a personality disorder.   
 
 
On  July  14,  199x,  the applicant  was  discharged  with  a  JFX  separation  code,  an 
RE-3G  reenlistment  code,  and  “unsuitability”  as  the  narrative  reason  for  separation 
shown on his DD 214. 
 
On March 27, 199x, the DVA found that the applicant was 10 percent disabled by 
 
dysthymic  disorder  and  that  this  condition  was  service-connected.    The  rating  was 
made  effective  retroactively  to  the  date  of  his  discharge  from  the  Coast  Guard.    The 
decision was based on the applicant’s service records, a neuropsychiatric report dated 
March 24, 199x, and a DVA examination dated February 6, 199x.  The examiner deter-
mined  that  his  condition  was  “chronic  and  severe”  since  he  complained  of  anxiety, 
depression, irritability, disturbed sleep, nightmares, difficulty concentrating, social iso-
lation, poor appetite, and decreased libido. 
 
 
On October 2, 199x, the DVA increased the applicant’s disability rating for dys-
thymic disorder to 50 percent, and this rating decision was made effective retroactively 
to the date of his discharge from the Coast Guard.  The decision was based on an exam-
ination  dated  September  17,  199x.    This  rating  was  reconfirmed  on  October  29,  199x, 
based on a subsequent examination. 
 
 
The  applicant  also  submitted  recent  records  of  his  counseling  sessions.    They 
indicate  that  he  is  being  treated  for  an  anxiety  disorder  with  obsessive  compulsive 
traits.  He is currently attending college. 
 

VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

On December 10, 2001, the Chief Counsel of the Coast Guard recommended that 

 
 
the Board deny the applicant’s request. 
 

The Chief Counsel argued that the applicant’s request was untimely because it 
was  not  submitted  within  three  years  of  his  discharge  or  even  within  three  years  of 
when  he  was  diagnosed  with  dysthymic  disorder  by  the  DVA.    He  alleged  that, 
although the Board may waive its three-year statute of limitations, it “must deny relief 
unless the Applicant presents sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that it would be 
in the interest of justice to excuse the failure to file timely.”  He argued that, under Dick-
son v. Secretary of Defense, 68 F.3d 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1995), in determining whether it is in 
the  interest  of  justice  to  waive  the  statute  of  limitations,  the  Board  must  consider  the 
reasons for the applicant’s delay and “make a cursory review of the potential merits of 
the claim.”  In this case, he argued, the Board should deny the request for untimeliness 
because  the  applicant  “has  failed  to  offer  substantial  evidence  that  the  Coast  Guard 
committed either an error or injustice by not referring his case to a physical evaluation 
board.”   

 
The Chief Counsel alleged that the applicant “was properly discharged by reason 
of ‘Unsuitability’” in accordance with Article 12.B.16. of the Personnel Manual.  Under 
Article 2.A.38. of the Physical Disability Evaluation System (PDES) Manual, personality 
and adjustment disorders are not physical disabilities.  He alleged that the applicant has 
not  proved  that  he  suffered  from  any  physical  disability  that  rendered  him  unfit  for 
duty when he was discharged in 199x, which is the “sole basis” for a disability separa-
tion under Article 2.C.2.a. of the PDES Manual.  Under Article 5.B. of the Medical Man-
ual, he argued, members with prolonged personality or adjustment disorders are dis-
qualified for service and should be administratively separated for unsuitability.   

 
The Chief Counsel alleged that the applicant has “failed to offer any evidence of 
error or injustice in the psychiatric evaluation he received prior to his separation or in 
his  separation  process.”    He  argued  that  psychological  testing  had  confirmed  Dr.  X’s 
diagnosis  of  a  dependent  personality  disorder.    Therefore,  he  alleged,  Dr. X  properly 
“found the applicant unsuitable for military service with no ratable physical disability.”  
He  alleged  that  Dr. X’s  finding  and  the  DVA’s  rating  “are  not  contradictory  findings 
and  are  explained  by  distinguishing  the  function  and  purpose  of  the  Coast  Guard’s 
[PDES] from those of the [DVA’s rating system].”  He alleged that under 10 U.S.C. chap. 
61, the PDES is “designed to compensate members whose military service is terminated 
due  to  a  service-connected  disability  and  to  prevent  the  arbitrary  separation  of  indi-
viduals who incur disabling injuries,” whereas the DVA’s system is designed to com-
pensate veterans “whose earning capacity is reduced, at any time, as a result of injuries 
suffered incident to, or aggravated by, military service.”  Lord v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 
749, 754 (1983). 

 

The Chief Counsel alleged that the applicant received all due process as provid-
ed in the Personnel Manual.  He pointed out that the applicant waived his right to con-
test his separation for unsuitability before an ADB.  Therefore, he argued, the applicant 
“has failed to demonstrate that either an error or an injustice occurred in his discharge,” 
and the Board should deny relief because, “absent strong evidence to the contrary, gov-
ernment officials are presumed to have carried out their duties correctly, lawfully, and 
in  good  faith.”  Arens  v.  United  States,  969  F.2d  1034,  1037  (Fed.  Cir.  1992);  Sanders  v. 
United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl. 1979). 

 

 

APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO THE COAST GUARD’S VIEWS 

On December 4, 2001, the Board sent the applicant a copy of the Chief Counsel’s 

 
 
advisory opinion and invited him to respond.  No response was received. 
 

APPLICABLE REGULATIONS 

Article  12-B-16  of  the  Personnel  Manual  in  199x  provided  that  members  diag-
nosed with personality disorders listed in Chapter 5 of the Medical Manual may be con-
sidered unsuitable for military service and administratively discharged.  Each member 
recommended for an unsuitability discharge must be informed of the reason in writing 
and afforded an opportunity to submit a statement in his own behalf.  In addition, if the 
member has more than eight years of military service, he is entitled to counsel and to 
contest his discharge before an ADB. 
 

Chapter  5-B  of  the  Medical  Manual  governs  the  disposition  of  members  with 
psychiatric disorders.  According to paragraph 2 of Chapter 5-B, a member diagnosed 
with  an  adjustment  disorder  or  a  dependent  personality  disorder that  interferes  with 
his  performance  of  duty  should  be  administratively  discharged.    According  to  para-
graphs 10 and 11 of Chapter 5-B, panic, anxiety, and dysthymic disorders are physical 
disabilities, and members diagnosed with them should be processed for disability sepa-
ration under the PDES. 

 
The PDES Manual governs the separation of members because of physical dis-
ability.  Chapter 2-A-36 states the term “physical disability” includes mental diseases 
that render a member unfit for continued duty but not personality disorders.  Chapter 
2-A-6 states that personality disorders “may cause an evaluee to be unfit for continued 
duty and yet not be physically [disabled] within the meaning of the law, thereby sub-
jecting the evaluee to administrative separation.”  
 
 
Chapter 2-A-15 of the PDES Manual defines the term “fit for duty” as “ . . . the 
status of a member who is physically and mentally able to perform the duties of office, 
grade, rank, or rating. . . .” 
 

Chapter 2-C-2.i. of the PDES Manual states the following: 

The  existence  of  a  physical  defect  or  condition  that  is  ratable  under  the 
standard schedule of rating disabilities in use by the [Department of Vet-
erans Affairs] does not of itself provide justification for, or entitlement to, 
separation or retirement from military service because of physical disabil-
ity.  Although a member may have physical impairments ratable in accor-
dance with the VASRD, such impairments do not necessarily render the 
member unfit for military duty. . . . 

 
 
Title 33 C.F.R. § 4.127 provides that “[m]ental deficiency and personality disor-
ders will not be considered as disabilities under the terms of the [DVA] schedule [for 
rating disabilities].”  
 
 
Under the provision of the Separation Designator Handbook, members involun-
tarily  discharged  because  of  personality  disorders  must  be  assigned  a  JFX  separation 
code  and  either  an  RE-3G  code,  which  allows  them  to  reenlist  if  their  conditions  are 
resolved, or an RE-4 code, which prohibits reenlistment. 
 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

 
 
The  Board  makes  the  following  findings  and  conclusions  on  the  basis  of  the 
applicant's military record and submissions, the Coast Guard's submissions, and appli-
cable law: 
 

The Board has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 10 U.S.C. § 1552.   

 
 

 

1. 

2. 

An application to the Board should be filed within three years of when the 
applicant discovers the alleged error in his record. 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b).  The record indi-
cates  that  the  applicant  knew  or  should  have  known  that  he  was  being  discharged 
administratively, instead of under the PDES, at the time of his discharge in July 199x.  
Moreover, the record indicates that he knew or should have known of his dysthymia 
when he was first rated by the DVA in March 199x.  Therefore, the Board finds that his 
application was untimely. 
   

Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b), the Board may waive the three-year stat-
ute of limitations if it is in the interest of justice to do so.  To determine whether it is in 
the interest of justice to waive the statute of limitations, the Board should consider the 
reason for the delay and conduct at least a cursory review of the merits of the case. Dick-
son v. Secretary of Defense, 68 F.3d 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1995).   
 
 
The applicant did not explain why he delayed applying to the Board; he 
merely  alleged  that  he  did  not  discover  the  error  until  1998.    As  stated  in  finding  2, 

4. 

3. 

5. 

however, the Board finds that he knew or should have known of the alleged error in his 
record by 199x at the latest.  However, in light of the fact that in 199x, the DVA decided 
that  the  applicant  had  been  50  percent  disabled  by  a  dysthymic  disorder—a  physical 
disability—since  the  date  of  his  discharge,  the  Board  finds  that  it  is  in  the  interest  of 
justice to waive the statute of limitations and consider the merits of the case. 
 
 
As the Chief Counsel argued, absent strong evidence to the contrary, gov-
ernment officials, including Dr. X and the applicant’s command, must be “presumed to 
have  carried  out  their  duties  correctly,  lawfully,  and  in  good  faith.”  Arens  v.  United 
States, 969 F.2d 1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. 
Cl. 1979).  The record indicates that the applicant has received various psychiatric diag-
noses over the years:  His homeport psychiatrist, Dr. X, diagnosed him with a depend-
ent  personality  disorder,  and  this  diagnosis  was  confirmed  by  psychological  testing 
prior to the applicant’s discharge; Dr. Y, the psychiatrist who examined him when his 
cutter  was  deployed,  diagnosed  him  with  a  panic  disorder  with  “limited  symptom 
attacks,”  “obsessive  compulsive  traits,”  and  “dependent  traits”;  the  DVA  diagnosed 
him with dysthymic disorder in 1996; and he is now being treated for an anxiety disor-
der with obsessive compulsive traits.  In light of this medical history, the Board cannot 
find that the applicant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. X erred 
in finding in 199x that he suffered from a dependent personality disorder—rather than 
a panic, dysthymic, or anxiety disorder—that made him unsuitable for further military 
service.   
 

Under Chapter 2-A-36 of the PDES Manual and 33 C.F.R. § 4.127, person-
ality disorders are not “physical disabilities,” and under Article 12-B-16 of the Personnel 
Manual, Chapter 5-B of the Medical Manual, and Chapter 2-A-6 of the PDES Manual, a 
member  diagnosed  with  a  personality  disorder  may  be  administratively  discharged.  
The record indicates that the applicant was diagnosed with a personality disorder by a 
psychiatrist  and  through  psychological  testing  and  that  his  condition  was  interfering 
with his performance of duty.  Therefore, the applicant has not proved that the Coast 
Guard erred in deciding to discharge him administratively or that he was entitled to a 
disability separation. 
 
The  record  indicates  that  the  applicant  received  all  due  process  while 
 
undergoing separation.  In accordance with Article 12-B-16 of the Personnel Manual, he 
was  assigned  counsel,  allowed  to  submit  a  written  statement  in  his  own  behalf,  and 
afforded an opportunity to contest his discharge before an ADB, which he  waived in 
writing. 
 
 
The applicant has not proved that the Coast Guard committed any error 
or injustice in assigning him an RE-3G reenlistment code.  Under the Separation Desig-
nator  Code  Handbook,  that  is  the  best  of  the  two  reenlistment  codes  authorized  for 
members involuntarily discharged because of personality disorders. 

7. 

6. 

8. 

9. 

The applicant has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Coast  Guard  committed  any  error  or  injustice  with  respect  to  his  discharge  or 
reenlistment code. 
 

[ORDER AND SIGNATURES APPEAR ON NEXT PAGE] 

10.  Accordingly, the applicant’s request should be denied. 

 

 

 
 
 
 

 
 
 

 
 

 

ORDER 

The application of former xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, USCG, for correction of 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

his military record is denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
James K. Augustine 

 

 

 
Murray A. Bloom 

 

 

 
 
Betsy L. Wolf